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A RESPONSE TO WILLIAM A. FISCHEL
STUART MECK*
CHARLES F. TUCKER **
Dr. Fischel critiques four points about the American Planning Asso-
ciation's (APA) amicus curiae brief: (1) The APA is not concerned
about the overall impact of growth management systems that restrict
the pace of development and therefore boost the cost of housing on a
metropolitan basis; (2) a monetary damages remedy for an interim tak-
ing from excessive land use controls is a better solution than the
"builder's remedy," which is court permission to allow the plain-
tiff/developer to construct a housing project in which housing units are
set aside for low- and moderate-income persons; (3) mandatory inclu-
sionary zoning allows communities, once they have fulfilled their fair-
share objective, to act in an exclusionary manner toward market rate
development; and (4) exclusionary zoning is somehow justifiable be-
cause everyone does it.
First, Dr. Fischel and the APA could certainly agree that land use
controls, by restricting supply of appropriately zoned land in the face
of increasing demand, raise housing prices. No citation to authorita-
tive studies is necessary to persuade us. Unfortunately, Dr. Fischel
seems to equate the Town of Chester's badly-drafted zoning code with
"growth management." But Wayne Britton v. Town of Chester, as the
trial court opinion indicates, is not about a town that was trying to
implement a growth management system under New Hampshire law,
that is, an integrated system of planning, land use controls and infra-
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structure expenditures in which development was to be phased over a
foreseeable future in accordance with a capital improvement program.
Chester was doing no such thing. Chester had no water or sewer lines
of its own, and the major road systems were state routes maintained by
the State of New Hampshire. Chester's master plan did not call for or
anticipate any major new infrastructure. Municipal service levels were
modest.
Instead of sophisticated growth management, Wayne Britton v. Town
of Chester is about none-too-subtle exclusionary zoning, as the trial
court found. The APA's brief points out that the town was using all
the classic land use devices to specifically keep out low- and moderate-
income housing. Despite a regional housing plan for southern New
Hampshire and a local master plan that both identified a need for af-
fordable housing and set short-term fair-share goals, and a zoning code
that offered illusory inclusionary "incentives," Chester really was not
interested in providing housing for low- and moderate-income persons,
whether indigenous to the town or expected to reside there.
Moreover, it appears Chester was pretty successful at excluding. Dr.
Fischel suggests that the "growth pressures" on Chester, whose 1988
population was estimated at 2550, may have been the result of monop-
olistic spillover effects from other, more conveniently located towns in
southern New Hampshire and northeastern Massachusetts which em-
ployed even more restrictive zoning. Our data, detailed in Appendix B
of the brief, suggest quite the opposite growth pattern was occurring.
United States Census Bureau counts for 1980 and estimates for 1988
showed that five of the six towns contiguous to Chester-Auburn, Can-
dia, Derry, Fremont, and Raymond - increased by 40 to 47% during
the 1980-88 period, while Sandown, the sixth, grew by 77.4%. In con-
trast, Chester increased by only 27.1% between 1980 and 1988, sharply
declining from its 45.2% rate during the 1970s. Chester was the pro-
verbial "hole in the doughnut" due to a growth rate markedly lower
than surrounding towns.
Second, Dr. Fischel questions why the APA did not endorse Profes-
sor Ellickson's theory of monetary damages for an interim taking from
excessive regulation.' Dr. Fischel's economic theories about the poten-
1. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385, 467-75 (1977) (discussion of proposed compensation scheme for reim-
bursing landowners and consumers damaged by growth control); see also id. at 493-500
(application of approach to exclusionary zoning).
Professor Ellickson's approach would be to use the takings clauses in state constitu-
tions to require suburbs which enact growth control measures to reimburse a landowner
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tial beneficial impact of Professor Ellickson's remedy notwithstanding,
the plaintiffs do not pursue damages for an interim taking for good
practical reasons: seeking a damages remedy considerably ups the ante
for plaintiffs because it brings into the case defense attorneys whose
fees and related costs are paid for by insurance companies indemnify-
ing the municipality. Plaintiffs in zoning cases like this one do not
have the same luxury of protracted or expensive litigation. They are
interested in getting affordable housing built quickly (and presumably,
being reimbursed for attorneys fees and costs). As a matter of strategy
and tactics, the plaintiffs simply ask for the builder's remedy. Getting
it is a better result than seeking a damages remedy, which often only
serves to enrich insurance defense attorneys with the opportunity to
pursue endless procedural impediments and appeals.
Third, Dr. Fischel contends that mandatory inclusionary zoning al-
lows communities, once they have fulfilled their fair-share objective, to
engage in exclusionary zoning rather than deregulate and increase the
overall supply of housing. To some degree, state planning legislation
will influence the behavior of towns. As we point out in our brief,2
there is no current requirement in the New Hampshire planning stat-
utes for towns to address any housing needs for low- and moderate-
income or market rate housing. The town master plan authorizes an
optional housing element, but the statutes do not require any commit-
ment to its implementation, and there is no state monitoring of local
regulatory efforts. In any case, absent a state statutory or Mount Lau-
rel style constitutional obligation, communities need not address low-
for damages based upon how much a land use restriction reduces the market value of
his land and to reimburse housing consumers (generally, as a class) for any damages
they have suffered as a result of housing price increases attributable to a suburb's land
use policies. As a defense, a suburb would have to affirmatively prove that its land uses
restrictions were fair to the respective parties and efficient. Id. at 469.
Because the plaintiff would bear the initial burden of proof, this complex, Rube
Goldberg compensation scheme would demand that the builder or low-income plaintiff
produce elaborate, costly economic evidence at trial, resulting in sort of a full employ-
ment act for economists and appraisers, which, no doubt, explains Dr. Fischel's enthusi-
asm for it (Ellickson, for example, expressly endorses the use of econometricians). A lot
of money would go toward attorneys and assorted expert witnesses, but no housing
would get built.
Ellickson does add that "[i]njunctive relief is appropriate, however, against a munici-
pal program motivated by discrimination against ethnic or ideological minorities." Id.
at 468.
2 See supra note 34 of APA Brief at 17 describing the planning requirements in
New Hampshire.
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and moderate-income housing needs at all. Consequently, Dr. Fis-
chel's critique on this point seems a little lame.
We agree that the salvation favored by economists - deregulation
- is a partial answer and one advocated in Mount Laurel!: get rid of
the devices that add unnecessarily to housing cost (like required mini-
mum floor areas and excessive subdivision improvement requirements),
speed up the approval process for developments, increase the supply of
residentially zoned land at higher densities, and you will lower the cost
of all housing. If it were only that simple. A single decision-making
body, presumably at the state level, would hand down the ultimatum,
delivered in stentorian tones: "YOU SHALL DEREGULATE AND
THE RISING TIDE OF DEREGULATION WILL LIFT ALL
BOATS."
Justice Pashman's concurring opinion in Mount Laurel I noted the
defect in relying soley upon the type of deregulation championed by
Dr. Fischel:
In theory, low and moderate income families should benefit
even from construction of new housing which they themselves
cannot afford because such housing creates vacancies which "filter
down." In reality, however, most of these vacancies are absorbed
by the enormous lag between population growth and new housing
construction. The housing which does "filter down" to persons
with low- or moderate-incomes is often badly dilapidated and in
deteriorating neighborhoods. 3
We think the primary mechanism to address these housing needs is
through the type of state legislative action contemplated in the Mount
Laurel decisions. No one forces towns to enact land use controls;
rather, state law "enables" them to do it. And where state law confers
a right, it also imposes a substantive constitutional obligation to look
out for a broader welfare than just that of the community enacting the
regulations.
Despite Dr. Fischel's assertions, the legislation resulting from Mount
Laurel, the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, seems to be working, 4
although perhaps too slowly, in producing housing units in suburban
areas that will directly benefit low- and moderate-income persons.
Over time, it may even lead to broad-scale regulatory reevaluation by
local governments as they try to determine how to lower housing costs
3. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 205, 336 A.2d 713, 741 (1975) (Mount Laurel 1) (citations omitted).
4. See supra Appendix D of APA Brief at 47-48,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol40/iss1/6
RESPONSE TO WILLIAM A. FISCHEL
to meet affordable housing goals or consideration of other non-zoning
alternatives such as rehabilitation to preserve or enhance the housing
stock.5
Dr. Fischel's final critique, drawn from his experience in serving as a
New Hampshire town zoning board alternate, is that exclusionary zon-
ing is okay because everybody does it. That reminds us of the classic
Woody Allen line "I'm guilty, your honor, but with an excuse." Dr.
Fischel has lots of excuses. We can expend our time in developing
elegant graphs of supply and demand curves and general propositions,
as he does in his 1985 book, The Economics of Zoning Laws, explaining
why things won't work in theory, or rationalizing why, when they do
happen to work in practice, that's bad too. Or we can take action in
the real world and try to get affordable housing built now in areas
where people need it.
The APA prefers the latter.
5. See supra Point IV of APA Brief at 32.
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